Ideas of Fairness in Financial Services Dispute Resolution by Condon, Mary
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
Ideas of Fairness in Financial Services Dispute Resolution 
Mary Condon 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, mcondon@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Janis Sarra (ed) An Exploration of Fairness (Carswell) pp.241-250, 2013 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Condon, Mary, "Ideas of Fairness in Financial Services Dispute Resolution" (2013). Articles & Book 
Chapters. 2787. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2787 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of 
Osgoode Digital Commons. 
AN EXPLORATION 
OF FAIRNESS: 
/i ' .. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES IN 
LAW, SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES 
Edited by Dr. Janis P. Sarra 
~.)o\H€'o& 




CO 2013 Thomson Reuters Canada Limited 
NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER: Al1 rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written 
consent of the publisher (Carswell). 
Carswell and all persons involved in the preparation and sale of this publication disclaim any 
warranty as to accuracy or currency of the publication. This publication is provided on the 
understanding and basis that none of Carswell, the author/s or other persons involved in the 
creation of this publication shall be responsible for the accuracy or currency of the contents, 
or for the results of any action taken on the basis of the infom1ation contained in this 
publication, or for any errors or omissions contained herein. 
No one involved in this publication is attempting herein to render legal, accounting or other 
professional advice. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a 
competent professional should be sought. The analysis contained herein should in no way be 
construed as being either official or unofficial policy of any governmental body. 
ISBN 978-0-7798-5363-2 
A cataloguing record for this publication is available from Library and Archives Canada. 
Composition: Computer Composition of Canada LP 
Printed in Canada by Thomson Reuters. 
CARSWELL, A DIVIS~C2~ OF l_~O-~SON REUTERS CANADA LIMITED 
One Corporate Plaza -------- -- -- ~_::_::__=--C-u-s-to_m_e_r -R-e-la_ti_o-ns 
2075 Kennedy Road Toronto 1_416-609-3800 
Toronto, Ontario 
Elsewhere in Canada/U.S. l-800-387-5164 




IDEAS OF FAIRNESS IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Mary Condon* 
1. INTRODUCTION: FAIRNESS IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
It is a widespread phenomenon in jurisdictions with developed fi-
nancial services industries that there is some form of organized resolution 
process for disputes between consumers and providers of financial ser-
vices. 1 Most recently, the G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Con-
sumer Protection, developed by the Task Force on Financial Consumer 
Protection of the OECD Committee on Financial Markets (CMF), in-
cludes, as the ninth of ten principles, a principle dealing with "Complaints 
Handling and Redress". This principle provides that 
[j]urisdictions should ensure that consumers have access to adequate 
complaints handling and redress mechanisms that are accessible, in-
dependent, fair, accountable, timely and efficient. Such mechanisms 
should not impose unreasonable cost, delays or burdens on consumers. 
In accordance \vith the above, financial services providers and authoris-
ed agents should have in place mechanisms for complaint handling and 
redress. Recourse to an independent redress process should be available 
to address complaints that are not efficiently resolved via the financial 
services providers and authorised agents' internal dispute resolution 
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. York University and Vice-Chair, Ontario 
Securities Co~mission. The views expressed in this chapter are personal and do not 
represent the views of any regulatory body. 
Those of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are 
most often discussed in the literature. but there are others. 
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mechanisms. At a minimum, aggregate information with respect to com-
plaints and their resolutions should be made public. 2 
In this chapter, I consider the various ways in which the idea of fair-
ness is given content in this dispute resolution regime and try to under-
stand how and why some of these ideas achieve legitimacy and some do 
not. A few framing comments should be made. First, the context for the 
analysis of fairness in this regime is that of two-party disputes, a context 
with which lawyers arc very familiar. On the other hand, the basic premise 
of the kinds of dispute resolution services discussed in this chapter is that 
they arc outside the fonnal legal system. For example, Gilad argues that 
the system of informal dispute resolution practiced by the Financial Om-
budsman Service (FOS) in the United Kingdom is "explicitly designed 
to offset some of the advantages enjoyed by RPs [repeat players] in court 
litigation".3 Nor are such processes intended to be directly "regulatory", 
in the sense that they are not intended to usurp the role of regulators in 
establishing appropriate norms and standards for firm-client interaction 
or investigating breaches of regulatory or self-regulatory requirements. 
Instead, they are focused on redress for clients on a relatively informal, 
case-by-case basis. 
The other central point here, and the core of the argument in this 
chapter, is that in these two-party disputes, by definition, one of the parties 
is always an organization-the financial services firm. 4 This case study of 
financial services dispute resolution, therefore, is an opportunity to con-
sider the way in which ideas of fairness arc defined by, and with respect 
to, organizations, and specifically in contexts where organizations are pit-
ted against individuals. Docs fairness systematically mean something dif-
ferent to an organization than it means to an individual? Confronting the 
question of how organizations "think" about fairness is useful and timely, 
not just in the context of the resolution of financial complaints on a granu-
lar basis, but more generally in the context of the global financial crisis 
Task Force on Financial Consumer Protection of the OECD Committee on Financial 
Markets(CMF), G20High-Leve/ Principles on Financial Consumer Protection(October 
2011 ). on line: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/regrefonn/liberalisationandcompetition· 
interventioninregulatedsectors/4889201 O.pdf>. 
Sharon Gilad, "Why the 'Haves' Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Infonnal 
Dispute Resolution" (2010) 32: 3 Law & Policy at 307. ,, 
E.g., Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI), "Terms of Reference 
(2010), online: OBSI <http://www.obsi.ca/imagcs/Documents/How_ We_ Work/Tenns_o.f_ 
Reference/tor_ dcc20 l O _ english. pdf> (refer to "participating firm "-that is, those financial 
services providers that are members of the OBSI). 
EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION 243 
and its aftermath.5 In the discussion to follow, I consider several alterna-
tive definitions of fairness that could be applicable to the situation of in-
fonnal dispute resolution; then I attempt to draw some conclusions about 
the relationship between these versions of fairness and the challenge of 
ongoing legitimacy for dispute resolution decision-making. 
2. EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION OF FINANCIAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IN 
CANADA 
I will use the Canadian example as a focus for discussion, recogniz-
ing that the legislative and structural context might be different in other 
jurisdictions. But I will try to indicate the features of the system that are 
common across a number of jurisdictions, as well as where they are dif-
ferent. At the moment, the body that performs external financial dispute 
resolution in the financial context in Canada is called the Ombudsman for 
Banking Services and Investments (OBSl).6 It was established in 1996 
to review complaints made by customers against banks, and in 2002 was 
expanded to include complaints made against investment firms and credit 
unions. It is important to note that its formation was not legislated, but 
rather, the result of voluntary agreement among members of the financial 
services industry. However, in Canada, the two biggest self-regulatory or-
ganizations (SRO) within the investment industry7 make it a requirement, 
through their rules, that members of the SRO be members of OBSI. In ac-
cordance with its terms of reference, the role of the Ombuds is to receive 
and investigate complaints and, thereafter, if appropriate, to make recom-
mendations to participating firms and complainants as to the appropriate 
resolution of a complaint.8 
The mandate of the Ombuds is to investigate a complaint once the 
participating firm has either rejected it or recommended a resolution that 
5 See Dimity Kingsford-Smith, "Can There be a Fair Share? Fairness, Regulation, and 
Financial Markets" (Chapter 17 of this volume). 
6 See Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI), "About Us", online: 
OBSI <http://www.obsi.ca/en/about-us>. . 
7 See The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), onlme: 
IJROC <www.iiroc.ca> and The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA), 
on! ine: MFDA <www.mfda.ca>. 
R OBSI, supra note 4 (OBSl's tenns ofreference are explicit that the Ombuds is NOT to 
provide legal, accounting, or other professional advice). 
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the complainant docs not accept.9 Consideration by OBSI of a complaint 
therefore occurs after the firm has investigated internally; that is, it is 
only when the complainant is not satisfied with the internal resolution of-
fered by the firm that a complaint will come to OBSI. There is a threshold 
amount beyond which the Ombuds may not recommend that a finn pay a 
complainant. 10 There arc similar thresholds in other jurisdictions, though 
the amounts vary. One standard feature of these kinds of dispute resolu-
tion systems is that there is no cost to the complainant of bringing a case 
to OBSI for investigation and resolution. Meanwhile, the costs of operat-
ing OBSI arc paid out of the membership fees that banking and financial 
services members pay to OBSI. 
OBSI's "fairness statement" says that it 
[r]esolves complaints with a view to what is fair and reasonable under 
the circumstances of each individual complaint [but also that it will] re-
solve complaints using an informal non-legalistic approach taking into 
account general principles of good financial services and business prac-
tice, law, regulatory policies and guidance, professional body standards 
and any relevant code of practice or conduct applicable to the subject 
matter of the complaint. 11 
A unique feature of the Canadian process is that recommendations 
of OBSI that the firm should pay money to an investor to resolve a com-
plaint arc not binding on that firm. 12 OBS I's terms of reference say that if 
a firm refuses to accept its recommendation, OBSI should publicly name 
that firm and the recommendation made by OBSI. 13 In practice, OBSI has 
done this infrequently. Nor, in Canada, is there an appeal mechanism from 
an OBSI decision, though this opportunity is available in jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom. 
OBSL supra note 4 at s. 9 (certain subject matters for complaints are outside the 
Ombuds' mandate~ e.g .• issues related to risk management policies and practices 
of a fim1. pricing of financial services. scale of fees or charges generally offered to 
customers of the fim1). 
10 That is. no amount greater than CS350.000 in respect of any single complaint. 
11 OBSI. .. OBSI Fairness Statement" (2011 ). online: OBSI <http://ww·w.obsi.ca!images/ 
Documents How \\'e \\·orkFaimess Statcment'obsi fairness statement_en.pdt>. 
c OBSI. supra not; 4 ats. 2-\. - - -
" !Nd at s. '27. 
< 
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The Navigator rcport14 indicates that Canada has a much smaller 
number of complaints annually about banking and financial services than, 
for example, Australia, even though Australia's population is smaller.'5 
The same report notes that investment-related complaints are "on aver-
age more complex and costly to investigate than other financial services 
complaints". 16 Many of the complaints brought to OBSI by investors in 
Canada concern the suitability (or otherwise) of the investments recom-
mended by their dealer or advisor for those investors, in light of relevant 
information that should have been collected and deployed by the firm, 
such as investors' "risk tolerance", their investment goals, or their finan-
cial circumstances. Particular features of investments recommended by 
advisors, such as the sales charges payable or the appropriateness of a 
particular "risk rating" for a financial product, are a recurring source of 
complaint. More specific problems have related to the methodology that 
is used by OBSI to determine how much compensation to recommend 
for the investor in the event that a financial recommendation is made. For 
example, should investors be compensated for lost opportunities if it is 
determined some years later that certain investments were inappropriate? 
Other conundrums revolve around the principles to be applied if a dealer 
recommended products to clients "off-book", that is to say, beyond the 
ambit of the products approved to be sold by the firm as a whole. This 
issue is a source of particular tension for firms in the sense that the indi-
vidual advisor or dealer may be found to be operating outside the ambit of 
her or his employment, but the firm is nevertheless ultimately called upon 
to satisfy OBSI's recommendation, if any, in favour of the client. 
As is evident from the discussion above, in resolving many of 
these disputes, there is a need for some kind of "investigation'' as to the 
positions of both sides, as well as, in some cases, an assessment of the 
14 Navigator Company, Ombudsman for Banking and Financial Services and !nve.:tments 
Report, 2011 Independent Review (20 I I), online: OBSI <~~://www.obst.ca/~age~ 
Documents/Ind Rev/independent review_of_obsi_20I J.pdf> (this ts an external re~icwe~ s 
report on OBSl The Dispute Re~lution Committee of Canada's Joint Forum of Fman~ial 
Market Regulators, which is currently the group of regulators responsible for overseeing 
OBSI, requires such a review to take place evety three years). 
15 
Ibid at 19. 
16 Ibid at l 0. 
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credibility of the story provided by one side or the other. This process 
serves to further blur the line between these sorts of dispute resolution 
processes and the types of activities engaged in by internal, firm-based, 
regulatory compliance and/or enforcement processes or the civil courts. It 
also, as I argue later, calls into question the credibility of OBSI to perform 
these activities in the absence of the usual institutional and nonnative 
structures provided by the official legal system, such as rules of evidence, 
norms for determining credibility, damages rules, and so on. 
4. FAIRNESS AS PROCESS? 
There is an explicit continuum between consistency of decision-
making and fairness expressed in OBSl's fairness statement. Thus, the 
statement indicates that the OBSI will 
[r]esolve complaints in accordance with externally reviewed poli-
cies and procedures to ensure consistency of approach and outcome in 
similar complaints. Notwithstanding this, the fairness objective is para-
mount and the Ombudsman shall not be bound by any previous OBSI 
rccommendation. 17 
OBSI publishes on its Web site a variety of "case studies" that are 
presumably intended to illustrate how the organization handles a variety 
of factual scenarios. It has also recently consulted with stakeholders about 
its approach to determining the quantum of losses suffered by an investor 
and the circumstances in which it will determine that an advisor gave un-
suitable investment advice to a client. As noted, OBSI explicitly prioritiz-
es its "fairness objective" at the expense of consistency. Thus, it indicates 
that the case studies on its Web site arc "not intended to set precedcnts".18 
Gilad argues that debates about the adequacy of these forms of 
dispute resolution stem from a divergence of interests among individ-
ual complainants and firms. She argues that individuals typically want 
"individualized justice", whereas organizations want rulcs. 19 This point 
recognizes that there is a structural difference between an individ-
ual complainant and the organization on the other side of the dispute. 
17 OBSI, supra note 11. 
18 See OBSI, Case Studies Web page, online: OBSI <www.obsi.ca>. 
19 Gilad, supra note 3 at 283 (specifically, she argues that "the typically indetenninate 
nature of informal dispute resolution settings renders them less susceptible to large 
organizations' and other repeat players' capacity to 'play for rules"'). 
rd 
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Organizations want to be able to plan and to achieve predictability, as ad-
verse decisions by an organization such as the OBSI not only have nega-
tive reputational effects, but also affect how advisors are trained and calls 
into question the adequacy of the firm's internal compliance processes. 
Meanwhile, clients are interested in redress on a one-time only basis, with 
a high degree of attention paid to context-specific elements. Yet, the sub-
ject matter of the dispute is typically about the relationship that has been 
forged between these two participants with varying interests at play and 
varying perspectives on the appropriate outcome. 
It was noted above how OBSI attempts to define the content of the 
fairness standards it imposes. Crucially, that content includes but goes be-
yond the legal standards imposed by courts, regulators, or professional 
bodies, to consider "general principles of good financial services and 
business practice". In other words, not only does this sort of dispute reso-
lution prioritize individualized fairness as opposed to consistency with 
prior OBSI recommendations, but those recommendations are based on 
the interpretation of norms that are not limited to the ones enshrined in 
legal precedent or current regulatory requirements. In this sense, a well-
established process is subordinated to the achievement of substantive 
outcomes, on the theory that individual complainants are vulnerable to 
disadvantage when dealing with sophisticated, well-financed firms. 20 But 
one result of this approach is that OBSI cannot necessarily look to legal 
precedent to provide justification for the results it recommends, but must 
seek credibility for its decision-making from other sources. 
5. FAIRNESS AS OUTCOME? 
Meanwhile, the Canadian Ombuds service stresses that its work does 
not necessarily result in most of its decisions being in favour of the con-
sumer. Data from the Navigator report indicates that the ratio of "overall 
decision win/loss for industry" was 71129 in Canada, based on the 2010 
annual report of OBSI.21 Apparently, the fact that firms win many m.ore 
cases than they lose does not give the organizations that are the subject 
20 An example is that OBSI's investigation may go beyond the information r~cord~d 
on the foundational know J'Our client form filled in at the outset of the relationship 
dd. · 1 · c- f on about that between the investor and the advisor, so as to uncover a it1ona m iorma 1 
investor's financial circumstances or investment goals. . . . 
21 Navigator Company, supra note 14 (comparative figures for indu~try wm/loss ratios m 
Australia and the United Kingdom were 61/39 and 50/50, respectively). 
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of complaints much comfort. Despite the possibility that these numbers 
could be interpreted by finns to mean that OBSI's investigations mostly 
turn out to support the firm's "side of the story", their concerns about the 
uncertainty of those outcomes remain. 22 Clearly, part of the concern de-
rives from the costs associated with the operations of OBSI, which the 
Navigator report indicates is pitched at $7,158 per complaint, higher 
than either Australia ($4,320) or the United Kingdom ($902). The Navi-
gator report attributes this higher cost in part to the greater willingness 
of OBSI to "investigate" complaints as compared to their international 
counterparts. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the trend whereby individual complain-
ants "lose" more matters than they win is not a subject of persistent dis-
satisfaction by individual investors or investor advocates. This trend is 
despite the fact that the stakes could be high for complainants if the in-
vestment disputes at issue relate to their retirement portfolios, and par-
ticularly if the discovery of shortcomings in handling investment accounts 
is belated. 
6. ATTRIBUTES OF FAIR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION? 
The argument of this chapter so far has been that neither an inter-
pretation of fairness as a particular prescriptive, rule-oriented process 
to be followed, nor an interpretation that focuses on who wins and who 
loses, has been successful at quelling ongoing dissatisfaction with exter-
nal financial dispute resolution in Canada. In the first case, one side has 
a radically different understanding of a fair process than the other does. 
In the second, neither side appears to regard win/loss rates as particularly 
relevant to an assessment of how well external dispute resolution works 
in practice. This perception raises the question of whether there are other 
indicia of fairness that might be more universally persuasive.23 
At least two possibilities suggest themselves. One involves the no-
tion of the independence of the decision-maker, and the other relates to the 
transparency of the decisions made. With respect to the first, it has been 
noted above that one of the high-level principles developed by the OECD 
22 lbidat8, 11, 13, 15, 16. 
23 Sec Mark E. Warren, "Democracy and the Everyday Origins of Fairness" (Chapter I of 
this volume). 
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with respect to financial consumer protection referenced the need for 
complaint handling systems that are independent. An interesting question, 
therefore, is whether, if a decision-maker is perceived to be independent 
and impartial as between both sides to a dispute, would it matter that the 
norms used to decide outcomes were more open-ended, or individualized 
than, for example, a legal system would support? In other words, it is 
possible that independence of perspective and open-mindedness may be 
valuable in and of itself, as a source of credibility for the decision-maker. 
In advancing this argument, I am cognizant of the cautionary note sound-
ed by Gilad's work, in which she calls for interrogation of the "heuristics" 
used by financial dispute decision-makers. 24 Examples of such heuristics 
include factors such as whether the complainant was represented, whether 
the complainant was a repeat complainant, and whether, in general, the 
complainant was perceived as "worthy" or "unworthy".25 Equivalent 
heuristics that reference characteristics of financial services firms could 
also be interrogated. What Gilad's argument points to is that an independ-
ence of perspective cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated to exist 
through actual decisions rendered. 
This latter point implicates the other possible indicia of fairness, 
which is the transparency of the decisions made. In this regard, it has been 
noted above that OBSI 's terms of reference provide that the investigation 
and outcome of specific complaints is confidential, at least until such time 
as the Ombuds decides to "name and shame" a firm that has not accepted 
its recommendation. 26 One significant consequence of the lack of trans-
parency attendant on OBSI's investigative and decision-making processes 
is that it prevents any systematic reassessment of the decision-making 
practices deployed,27 including whether or not OBSI did in fact maintain 
its impartiality in the process of coming to a recommendation, or alt~rna­
tively whether it adopted particular working assumptions of co~plamant 
or firm characteristics in its decision-making. In other words, it may be 
an underlying structural problem for this dispute resolution system that 
the decision-making engaged in cannot be evaluated by observers for the 
presence of features that would make it more generally acceptable. 
24 
Gilad, supra note 3 at 284. 
25 Ibid. 
26 OBSI, supra note 4 at ss.18-20 (Section 28 of the tenns of reference does allo~ for 
public annual reporting by OBSI as to its activities, and reasons for the r~comn:endattons 
of OBSI in individual cases are provided to the parties on a confide~ttal ~asts). f h 
21 N . h · th text of a review like that o t e av1gator Company, supra note 14 (other t an m econ 
Navigator Report, which occurs every three years). 
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7. CONCLUSION: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND LEGITIMACY 
The argument of this chapter has been that, in this example of fi-
nancial services decision-making, one of the disputing sides ascribes a 
different content to fairness than the other side docs. For the participating 
finns involved, fairness resides in the ability to count on known patterns 
of behaviour deployed by the Ombuds service, predictability of outcome 
and, relatedly, to conformity with other systems for dispute resolution, 
notably court-based systems. For the organizations involved in these dis-
putes, there arc multiple processes at issue, such as internal complaint 
handling protocols, OBSI investigations and recommendations, potential 
SRO arbitrations, court-based adjudication, and so on. Not only that, but 
these organizations obviously have considerations at play other than the 
fairness of dispute resolution processes, including operational cost, effi-
ciency, and overall profitability. 
None of these considerations is an issue for the individual complain-
ant on the other side of these disputes. Yet, the normative justification 
for the existence of a dispute resolution process like the one described 
above is precisely that individual complainants will be disadvantaged by 
the requirement to mobilize the more formal mechanisms available, not 
only because of how much these processes would cost the complainant, 
but because typically the amount of losses incurred would not justify the 
expenditure required, from a cost-benefit point of view. 
Ultimately, I argue that resolving this impasse of competing defin-
itions of fairness may require a closer look at other, foundational ways of 
ascribing content to the idea of fairness in external dispute resolution, be-
yond a focus on comparisons with the traditional attributes of legal-type 
processes, or on typical outcomes. Two possible forms of normative com-
mitment that could hold some promise of rendering financial dispute reso-
lution more enduringly legitimate have been briefly canvassed. Further 
evaluation of the merits of these interpretations of fairness in the specific 
context of informal dispute resolution may even hold broader promise for 
the assessment of post-crisis financial systems more generally. 
